At the September 30 hearing, the defendants argued for the first time that ABA Interpretation 203-1 does not bind the University because it says a dean “should not” be appointed over the stated objection of a substantial majority of the faculty, rather than “shall not.” I responded that Interpretation 203-1 states what the mandatory requirement…

The court denied my motion for a temporary injunction setting aside Dean Van Tatenhove’s appointment. The court found that “the faculty participated in good faith in each of the searches, that the University failed to hire, or even extend offers, to numerous well-qualified candidates approved by the faculty, and then hired the only candidate who…

The court quashed my subpoenas to Van Tatenhove, Capilouto, and DiPaola to testify at the September 30 hearing on my motion for a temporary injunction. It described the disputed facts as “broader issues of university governance,” and said it was unsure what statute or case law would allow a court to intervene in the appointment…

Against a thicket of violated rules, the University offers only that a statute gives its Board of Trustees exclusive jurisdiction over appointments and that the Board delegated that power to the President. But exclusive jurisdiction over appointments cannot authorize the University to violate the Kentucky Constitution or the contracts it has voluntarily entered into.

The University argues that I lack standing because the rights I assert belong to the faculty as a whole. I explain that my expressive-association, contract, and other claims are personal to me.

I compare the University’s response to political pressure with Cambridge’s handling of a controversial appointment. I also show that the Van Tatenhove appointment violated three accreditation standards and the University’s own appointments regulation.

The University moved to dismiss the state dean case.

The University relied on the federal court’s opinion denying expedited discovery in my voluntarily dismissed federal case. I explain that the opinion addressed only my federal expressive-association claim, not my arbitrary-power, contract, and speech-chill claims under Kentucky law, and I respectfully set out why I believe its analysis of expressive association should not be followed.

I refiled the dean case in Franklin Circuit Court. The claims now arise under the Kentucky Constitution and the University’s own rules, which incorporate accreditation standards prohibiting the appointment of a dean over the objection of the faculty without good cause.